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State v. White: Absent Waiver, is the Failure to Provide an 
Initial Appearance Plain Error? 
 
Mike Wilson 
 
No. DA 13-0589 Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 10:45 a.m. in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 
Building, Helena, Montana. The matter was taken into advisement just 
after 11:40 a.m.  
 
I. GREGORY HOOD FOR THE APPELLANT 
 
Mr. Hood began his argument by framing the right to be present 
at a critical stage of the proceedings as a personal right that exists for 
every defendant. Hood argued when a district court infringes upon a 
personal right in any way, the Court should dismiss the district court’s 
verdict without prejudice.  
After a couple of questions from Justices Rice and McKinnon 
concerning the Appellant’s civil commitment, Justice Shea questioned 
Hood about the Appellant’s assertion that an uncontested competency 
hearing is a critical stage. Justice Shea questioned whether the 
proceeding even constituted a hearing since the Appellant’s lack of 
fitness was uncontested. Hood answered that although the hearing was 
not required by statute because fitness was uncontested, when the district 
court held a hearing anyway, it was a critical stage. 
Despite the Appellant’s assertion that any amount of prejudice 
was sufficient to require dismissal, several Justices asked Hood to 
explain how the Appellant was prejudiced when he was not contesting 
his fitness to proceed. Hood explained the right to be present protects the 
defendant’s right to observe and participate in his defense. Justice Shea 
asked Hood whether a person who is held unfit to proceed is also unfit to 
observe his attorney and participate in his defense. After Hood reiterated 
his client’s personal rights only require minimal prejudice argument, 
Justice Wheat asked him to explain specifically what prejudice his client 
suffered. When Hood explained the Appellant did not have the 
opportunity to observe his attorney in the proceeding, Justice Wheat 
responded: “That’s it?”  
Mr. Hood spent the remainder of his time arguing that the district 
court’s failure to complete an initial appearance hearing—where the 
Appellant would have been advised of his rights and of the charges 
against him—warranted a dismissal of the conviction. Justice McGrath 
questioned whether counsel could waive an initial appearance on behalf 
of his client. Hood answered an attorney may not waive his client’s 
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initial appearance. Justice Cotter asked for an explanation of the 
prejudice caused by the lack of an initial appearance in this case. Justice 
Baker questioned whether the prejudice caused was sufficient to satisfy a 
plain error standard. In response to both queries, Hood again argued an 
initial appearance is a personal right and any infringement constitutes 
sufficient prejudice to warrant dismissal.  
 
II. TAMMY HINDERMAN FOR APPELLEE 
 
Assistant Attorney General Hinderman began by arguing the 
Appellant could not satisfy the plain error standard of review applicable 
in this case. In her words, “plain error is the rare exception, not the rule.” 
Hinderman argued there was no prejudice caused by the Appellant’s 
absence from the uncontested competency hearing. According to 
Hinderman there was nothing for the Appellant to observe. No evidence 
was presented at the hearing. The district court simply followed the 
statute. Hinderman pointed out it is not uncommon for a defendant to be 
civilly committed during a criminal trial. Here, the defendant’s 
psychiatric issues constituted a medical emergency, and he required 
medication. 
The Justices pressed Hinderman on the district court’s failure to 
provide the Appellant with an initial appearance hearing. Justice Baker 
asked if there was any reason the initial appearance could not have been 
held via video once the Appellant was fit to proceed. Hinderman 
answered “No.” Justice McKinnon asked if Hinderman was asking the 
Court to issue an opinion that said a complete lack of an initial 
appearance was okay. Hinderman answered although the initial 
appearance did not occur, many of the same things that occur during an 
initial appearance did occur. Hinderman explained that during an initial 
appearance the Appellant would have been advised of his right to an 
attorney—he already had one. Appeallant would have been advised of 
his right to remain silent—he made no statements. Although Hinderman 
could not recall if Appellant had been advised of the charges against him, 
Justice McGrath pointed out bail had been set; therefore, charges must 
have been discussed. Hinderman concluded by stating the only thing the 
Appellant was not advised of that would have been covered in an initial 
appearance hearing was that his right to own firearms might be affected. 
However, she pointed out the Appellant’s previous criminal record 
already made him ineligible to own a firearm; therefore, he was not 
prejudiced by this failure to notify. 
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III. PREDICTION 
 
A. Right of presence at critical stages issue 
 
Several Justices seemed skeptical of the Appellant’s claim that 
the uncontested competency hearing constituted a critical stage of the 
proceedings against him and therefore the Appellant had a right to attend 
the hearing—much less that he was prejudiced by his absence. Unless a 
majority is persuaded by the Appellant’s arguments that (1) presence at a 
critical stage is a personal right; and (2) infringement of a personal right 
always constitutes plain error, it is hard to see the Appellant prevailing 
on this issue. The Justices did not seem moved by the Appellant’s 
argument that while he was undoubtedly unfit to proceed, he could have 
played a role in his defense or even observed the proceedings. There is a 
better chance the Court will find the proceeding was not a competency 
hearing at all than they will find it was a critical stage and the Appellant 
was prejudiced.  
 
B. Failure to provide an initial appearance issue 
 
The right to an initial appearance before the court where the 
court informs the defendant of his rights and of the charges against him 
exist to ensure a defendant receives due process. In this case, the Court 
has three options: (1) issue an opinion that declares the lack of an initial 
appearance does not violate due process; (2) issue an opinion that creates 
a bright-line rule stating the failure to provide an initial appearance 
always constitutes plain error; or (3) declare that on these facts, the 
Appellant was not prejudiced by the lack of an initial appearance.  
Based on the tone of Justice McKinnon’s question regarding 
whether the State was seeking the first option, that option is almost 
certainly off the table. Of the two remaining choices—a bright-line rule 
or a multifactor test—the bright-line rule option seems most likely to 
carry the day. Although the Appellant exercised some of the rights he 
would have been advised of in his initial appearance, and he was likely 
not prejudiced by the lack of being informed of the others; even so, 
because an initial appearance exists to protect a fundamental right—due 
process—the Court will likely provide the higher protection of a bright-
line rule. This option becomes even more likely when the complications 
involved with administering a multifactor test are considered. 
 
Lower Court: Gallatin County Cause No. TK 11-629; Honorable Mike 
Salvagni, District Court Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District. 
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Attorneys for Appellant, Mark Nicholas White: Wade Zolynski, Chief 
Appellate Defender; Gregory Hood, Assistant Appellate Defender 
(Argued). 
 
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Montana: Timothy C. Fox, Montana 
Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler, Appellate Services Bureau Chief; 
Tammy A. Hinderman, Assistant Attorney General (Argued). 
  
 
